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[1965] 2 O.R. 347 (Ont.
[1966] 1

H.C.); HEATHER HILL APPLIANCES V. MCCORMACK ET AL.,

O.R. 12 (Ont. H.C.)-LABOUR RELATIONS-SECONDARY PICKETINGALTHOUGH PEACEFUL--PUBLIC POLICY-In two recent
cases, Robertson Yates Corp. Ltd. v. Fitzgerald' and Heather Hill
Appliances v. McCormack¢ et al.,2 the High Court of Ontario has
prohibited any attempt at "secondary picketing". In doing so they
purported to follow Hersees v. Goldstein3 which declared that such
secondary picketing was "illegal per se". Leave to appeal to the
Supreme Court has been granted in the Heather Hill case and it is
hoped that the court will reconsider the whole matter of secondary
picketing. Both these cases illustrate the harsh line that Ontario
courts have taken since peaceful picketing was declared legal in
Williams v. Aristocratic Restaurants.4 In Robertson Yates v. Fitzgerald, operating engineers, members of a trade union, were on strike
against the Wellesley Hospital. At the time an addition was being
constructed to the hospital by an independent contractor. Although
the employees of this contractor had no dispute with him, they
honoured the picket line so that work was effectively halted. It was
found as a fact in the case that there had been no violence on the
picket line and "it could be described as peaceful picketing."5 However the court decided that Hersees specifically covered the situation
and that the secondary picketing was illegal as it interfered with the
business activity of a neutral contractor. A similar approach was
taken in the Heather Hill case. There, printers on strike against the
Toronto newspapers decided to picket Heather Hill appliances because it advertised- in the Telegram. It was again found as a fact
that the picketing was peaceful and that there had been no attempt
to cause a breach of any specific contract between the plaintiff and
anybody else. The court then stated: "In other words, it appears
clear that had the picketers been engaged in a legal strike against
Heather Hill Appliances Ltd. their behaviour in picketing would have
been lawful." 6 However the court went on to say that Hersees had
decided that secondary picketing was illegal per se and that therefore
this picketing was illegal.
UNLAWFUL

Before considering these two cases more closely it is necessary
to review briefly the history of picketing in Ontario since Williams
v. Aristocratic Restaurants.7 In this case a union had been certified
as bargaining agent for the employees of the restaurant. When the
union failed to negotiate a collective agreement, conciliation proceedings resulted. The union refused to accept the report and although
it had lost its members in the bargaining unit, it was still certified and
hired picketers to parade in front of the restaurant. The majority
1 [1965] 2 O.R. 347 (Ont. H.C.).
2 [1966] 1 O.R. 12 (Ont. H.C.).
3 [1963] 2 O.R. 81 (C.A.).
4 [1951] S.C.R. 762.
5 Supra, footnote 1, at p. 348.
6 Supra, footnote 2, at p. 14.
7 Supra, footnote 4.
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of the Supreme Court held that this picketing did not constitute a
nuisance and did not contravene the prohibitions against watching
and besetting in the Criminal Code. 8
Rand J., in his judgment squarely presented the main consideration:
The question, then, is whether the mode of persecution followed was
authorized. How could information be effectively communicated to a
prospective customer of such a business otherwise than by such means?
The appeal through newspapers or at a distance might and probably
would be utterly futile. The persons to be persuaded can, with any degree
of certainty be reached only in the immediate locality, and I must take
the Legislature to have intended to deal with the matter in a realistic
manner. What was attempted was to persuade rationally rather than to
coerce by insolence, there was no nuisance of a public nature, and the
only annoyance would be the resentment felt almost at any act
in the
competitive conflict by the person whose interested is assailed.9

Rand J. recognises that such picketing could economically injure
an employer but he concludes:
But even if they should not extend to public appeal, I should hold the
act innocent where it is done for such an object: the public is obviously
and substantially interested in the fair settlement of such contests.10
From this judgment it would seem that the courts could have
easily gone one step further to hold that secondary picketing, if
done peacefully, could also be legal.
The Ontario courts, however, have shrunk from the full implication of the Williams judgment." As will be seen, in the field of secondary picketing, they have set up the criteria that interference with
a trader who is not involved in the strike, is contrary to his economic
rights and of greater harm to the public interest than the benefits
that would arise from such picketing. Since the Williams judgment
this attitude has been reflected in Ontario decisions dealing even
with primary picketing. Thus, in General Dry Batteries of Canada
Ltd. v. Brigenshaw,12 where employee members of the union had in
breach of their collective bargaining agreement gone on strike before
resort was had to the compulsory conciliation procedure provided by
The Ontario Labour Relations Act, McRuer C.J.H.C. held that the
resulting picketing could not be enjoined as long as it was peaceful;
but he then went on to state:
I am not at all convinced that, in what one may call the guise of advancing their interest in a labour dispute, employees are entitled to bring
external pressure to bear on others who are doing business with a particular person for the purpose of injuring
the business of their employer
so he may capitulate in the dispute. 13
8 S. 366 of the Criminal Code.
9 Supra,footnote 4, at p. 785.
10 Ibid., at p. 786 (my emphasis).
11 For an extremely informative essay on this issue see: Earl E. Palmer,
The Short, Unhappy Life of the 'Aristocratic Doctrine', (1959), 13 U. of Toronto
L.J. 166.
12 [1951] 4 D.L.R. 414 (Ont. H.C.).
13 Ibid., at p. 419.
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In the later case of Nipissing Hotel v. Hotel and RestaurantEmployees
etc. Union,14 where the union again had broken off negotiations with
the employer before compulsory conciliation, the court went even
further and had no trouble enjoining the picketing that resulted.
Here they easily distinguished the Williams case by stating that in
that case the union had attempted to bargain in good faith, while,
in this case, the union employees had arbitrarily broken off negotiations and thus were guilty of bad faith. The picketing was found to be
an attempt to coerce the employer, and the court held that at this
stage of the negotiations "the use of pressure or coercion even in
the mildest form, destroys the freedom and the equality both parties
must have at the bargaining table so they cannot 'bargain in good
faith and make every reasonable effort to make a collective
agree5
ment' as stated in s. 12 of The Labour Relations Act."'
In Smith Brothers v. Jones16 the union, though having no collective agreement with the employer, was trying to force that employer
to pay union wages and thus picketed any job where he was working.
McLennan J. after finding "no evidence of any violation, disturbance
or persuasion of any kind other than the mere fact of their presence
with signs" went on to hold:
[In my opinion, if the development of the trade union movement has
reached the point where workers will not cross a picket-line to go to
work, that is just as effective an interference with contractual relations
as any other form of restraint might be. Loyalty to the rule that I have
mentioned having been developed, the rule should 7not be abused for a
wrongful purpose and where there is no justification.'

The door was open for the Ontario courts to apply the same
reasoning to secondary picketing. Thus in the case of Har-A-Mac
Construction Co. Ltd. v. Harkness, 18 where defendant members of a
union had failed to become bargaining agents of the plaintiff's employees, and had set up a picket line so the subcontractors would not
enter the job, the court granted an injunction. Here the Williams
case had specifically been pleaded, but the court had no trouble
distinguishing the case, to follow the Smith case and Bennett &,White
v. Van Reeder 19 (a case of similar facts in the Alberta Supreme
Court that had refused to follow the Williams case). Considering
the Williams case, Aylen J. said:
The question of breach of contract did not arise.... In the Williams
case a dispute had arisen in connection with labor negotiations of a
bona fide20nature and the union was attempting to protect its legitimate
interests.

In any21event Aylen J. had no hesitation in following Smith Bros. v.
Jones.
[1963] 1 O.R. 81, [1963] 2 O.R. 169 (Ont. H.C.).
15 [1963] 1 O.R. 81, at p. 83.
16 [1955] O.R. 362 (Ont. H.C.).
17 Ibid., at p. 371.
18 [1958] O.W.N. 366 (Ont. H.C.).
19 [1957] 6 D.L.R. (2d) 326 (Alta. S.C.).
14

20 Supra,footnote 18, at p. 367.
21

Supra,footnote 16.

1966]

Case Comment

This brings us to a consideration of Hersees of Woodstock Ltd. v.

Goldstein22 where secondary picketing was held to be illegal per se.
In this case the union was in a dispute with Deacon Sportswear Co.,
who supplied Hersees with goods for his store. When Hersees refused
the union's request not to deal with Deacon, the union picketed outside Hersees' store. The picketing was peaceful and the placards
only stated that Deacon sportswear was sold by Hersees and that such
sportswear was made by non-union Labour. Presumably one could
argue that this picketing was peaceful, to provide the public with
information and was therefore lawful by the Williams case test. This,
however, was far from the result; the judges in righteous anger raised
their voices against any attempt to interfere with free enterprise.
Aylesworth J.A. states:
In the City of Woodstock where that business is being carried on, the
picketing ... has caused or is likely to cause damage to the appellant.
Therefore, the right, if there be such a right of the respondents to engage
in secondary picketing of the appellant's premises must give way to the
appellant's right to trade; the former assuming it to be a legal right, is
exercised for the benefit of a particular class only, while the latter is a
right far more fundamental and of greater importance, in my view,
as one which in its exercise affects and is for the benefit of the community at large.23
This statement seems to be in direct contradiction to Mr. Justice
Rand's view, in the Williams case, that a fair settlement of the strike
was more in the public interest.24 Aylesworth J.A. then goes on to
declare that secondary picketing is illegal per se.25 In holding this,
the judge quotes a long line of cases, particularly relying on the
Supreme Court decision in Patchett v. Pacific Great Eastern Railroad Company.26 However, as Prof. Arthurs has pointed out,27 the
court in the Patchett case would have equally held primary.picketing
illegal because of the tortious nature of the picketing. It is thus
impossible to say that this decision squarely declares secondary
picketing illegal per se. MacKay J.A. in the same tone declares:
"In the present case the right of the Union to advance the interests
of the employees of Deacon Brothers in the manner in which they
have attempted is in conflict with the right of the plaintiff to carry
on its business without undue interference and, in my view, the
benefit to employees of Deacon Brothers would be negligible com28
pared to the harm that would be done to the plaintiff in its business.
In the light of these Ontario decisions, the results in Yates and
Heather Hill could hardly be called surprising. Again the prime concern of the court is that the economic interest of an innocent trader
might be damaged. In the Yates case Lieff J. found "it was obvious
that in so far as the defendants are concerned their desire is more
than the conveying of information to the general public but rather
22 Supra, footnote 3. For a criticism and commentary on this important
case see H. W. Arthurs, Comment on Hersees of Woodstock v. Goldstein
(1963), 41 Can. Bar Rev. 573.
23 Supra, footnote 3, at p. 86.
24 Supra, footnote 4, at p. 786.
25 Supra, footnote 3, at p. 88.
26 [1959] S.C.R. 271.
27 Supra, footnote 22, at p. 582.
28 Supra, footnote 3, at p. 90.
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it appears to also contain an element of boycott. '29 He concludes it is
a boycott
because the trades who are engaged in the construction of the addition
to the hospital will not cross the picket line. They thus bring the plaintiff's
construction job to a standstill.30
Stewart J. in Heather Hill seems to echo these sentiments: "The picket
line has become the sign and symbol of trade union solidarity and
gradually become a barrier-intangible but nonetheless real. '31 He
goes on to consider secondary picketing:
But what about 'secondary picketing'? That is, the watching and besetting of a place occupied by a person or a company having no dispute with
the picketers or its employees. On the surface, the presence of a few amiable sandwich-men bearing non-libellous statements strolling discreetly
apart seems harmless enough. But so does an electric fence. . . .It
frequently prevents a wholly innocent party from earning his living and
creates a situation 32
in the locality, which, to me, seems clearly unfair to
the person picketed.
It.
would be unrealistic to believe that primary picketing is carried
on merely to convey information to the public. It is equally clear
that secondary picketing also has an economic motive. In both cases
the union is attempting to exert economic pressure to force collective
bargaining. This, at first blush, seems to contravene the exception
granted by s. 366(2) that, "[a] person who attends at or near or
approaches a dwelling house or place, for the purpose only of obtaining or communicating information, does not watch or beset within
the meaning of the section". The Code thereby implies that picketing
done for any other purpose than to convey information is illegal
within the ambit of s. 366(1) (f). Yet the Supreme Court in the
Williams case considered this very section and found there was a
difference between an attempt to coerce the employer and an attempt
to persuade by rational appeal. 33 The latter, the court held, did not
amount to "watching and besetting" within the meaning of the
section. It is, then, difficult to understand how "rational appeal" is
accepted in primary picketing but suddenly becomes sinister in
secondary picketing.
Basically the main criticism the courts have against secondary
picketing is that it is successful. Lieff J. in the Yates case found a
boycott because the other unions respected the picket line.34 The
inference is that had the other unions not respected the picket line,
the picketing would have been legal. In other words the union is
being punished because it is successful. Similarly, Stewart J. in the
Heather Hill case finds that secondary picketing is like an "electric
fence" and because it hurts the trade of a party not involved in the
dispute, it is therefore illegal. Thus both judges are deciding on
29 Supra,footnote 1, at p. 348.
30 Ibid.
31 Supra, footnote 2, at p. 13.
32 Ibid.
33 Supra, footnote 4, at p. 784.
34 Supra, footnote 1, at p. 348. Space does not permit a discussion of the
common situs problem. It hardly seems, however, that Hersees had the situation of Yates in mind. For an American discussion see: L. T. Zimmerman,
Secondary Picketing and the Reserved Gate (1961), 47 Va. Law Rev. 1164.
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principles completely different from that laid down in the Williams
case. That case made it clear that the issue to consider was the picketing itself. If the picketing was peaceful and non-libellous then it was
legal, even if the economic interest of the trader, who was picketed,
was hurt. In the Yates and Heather Hill cases there is a complete
reversal of this reasoning. Here the issue considered is not the
picketing itself but the result of that picketing. Thus if the secondary
picketing damages the economic interest of a trader it is illegal, no
matter if the picketing is peaceful and non-libellous. The union is
therefore penalized only if the secondary picketing creates the desired
pressure to bring about a collective bargaining agreement.
It seems strange that different approaches should be taken for
primary picketing on the one hand and secondary picketing on the
other. The courts have tried to justify these different techniques by
stating that secondary picketing is for the benefit of a "particular
class" only; while the innocent trader's right to trade is for the
benefit of the "community at large", 35 As both Professor Arthurs 36
and Professor Carrothers 37 have pointed out, this view of secondary
picketing seems contrary to the history of collective bargaining. Such
bargaining, since the reign of Queen Victoria, has always been thought
of "as part of the public policy of this country. '38 Rand J. in the
Williams case asserted that the public "is obviously and substantially
interested in the fair settlements of such contests". 39 In these circumstances it is hard to justify the logic that declares the right of one
trader is for the benefit of the community while pressure to force
settlement of a strike is simply for the benefit of a particular class.
In the light of these inconsistencies between statements in the
Williams case and the decisions in the Yates and Heather Hill cases,
the Supreme Court is confronted with a difficult problem. Do we want
unions to have the additional weapon of secondary picketing to force
collective bargaining? Is it more in the public interest to insure the
freedom of a trader's right to trade than to protect the right to exert
pressure by secondary picketing for the settlement of labour disputes?
It is not the purpose of this casenote to suggest answers to these
questions; rather to suggest that the Court could, following the decision in Williams easily justify peaceful secondary picketing. If on
the other hand the court decides that the freedom of the right to
trade is more in the public interest than the added pressure to bring
about collective bargaining by secondary picketing, it is hoped that
court will consider the Williams case and clearly define the limitations
of that decision. Certainly, considering the case law, a definitive
statement by the Supreme Court on the issue of secondary picketing
is sorely needed.
TIMOTHY W. SARGEANT'

Supra, footnote 3, at p. 86.
36 Supra, footnote 22, at p. 585.
37 For a general discussion of the topic of secondary picketing see the
new book: A. W. R. Carrothers, Collective Bargaining Law in Canada (1965),
pp. 458-461.
38 Supra, footnote 37, at p. 462.
39 Supra, footnote 4, at p. 786.
- Mr. Sargeant is a third year student at the Osgoode Hall Law School.
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